matt's blog.: Op-ed: Putting Crimea on the Altar: Avoiding Another Frozen Conflict

Wrote this for school. I'm aware that the position is controversial, but consider it a very realpolitik take on the situation. I personally feel for everyone in Crimea who are against annexation by Russia/secession from Ukraine, especially the Crimean Tatars. But here it is. All you copy editors out there will probably be itching to fix most of it. Also, it's long, about 1,500 words, so be warned. Direct your comments, negative or positive, to the comments section below.

Putting Crimea on the Altar: Avoiding Another Frozen Conflict

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:VOA-Crimea-Simferopol-airport.jpg

Recent events in Ukraine—the flight of President Viktor Yanukovych, his subsequent impeachment by the VerkhovnaRada, and the installation of an interim government made up of opposition leaders from the Fatherland party and a few of the Maidan protest leaders—have led to an even greater crisis: a quiet but thorough invasion of Crimea by Russian troops. While the situation facing Ukraine’s new leaders in late February looked bleak, this most recent development borders on catastrophe. But despite a week of tension, restraint shown by both sides has kept the crisis from escalating into violence between Russian troops and the Ukrainian armed forces on the peninsula. On March 4, President Vladimir Putin held a press conference in which he reassured journalists that he was “certain that the Ukrainian military and the Russian military will not be facing each other” and later affirmed that he did not consider the possibility of Crimea joining Russia in the future.[1] This assuaged fears that Russia might possibly invade south-eastern Ukraine, but in the same press conference Putin also reserved the right to engage in further military action if needed.

What is striking about this face-off on the Crimean peninsula between Russia and Ukraine is its resemblance to other separatist conflicts in the region. The former Soviet space is home to several “frozen conflicts” in which opposing parties have been unable to successfully negotiate a resolution that both sides are happy with: Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Georgia’s breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the breakaway republic of Transnistria in Moldova. Crimea could easily turn into yet another frozen conflict—a grey zone “in which there is no clearly recognized legitimate authority, no rule of law and no enforcement of human rights.”[2] The prevalence of such areas in Russia’s backyard and the inability to resolve them (despite years of diplomatic efforts in most cases) suggests that there may be more behind the longevity of these conflicts than the issues themselves. Often, Russia has more to gain through maintaining the status quo in these conflicts than actually resolving them. But could the Kremlin really be interested in keeping these conflicts going for its own personal gain? Determining intentionality in the Kremlin’s decision-making can be a tricky business. Often the Russian government will proclaim its commitment to one ideal while its actions proclaim something quite different. Or it will act audaciously and then deny that it has participated in any wrongdoing. All of this makes trying to draw conclusions about Russian policy making problematic. However, a quick look at the other frozen conflicts and an appraisal of the situation in Crimea may help us get a feel for how the Russian government benefits from these frozen conflicts.

Probably the most significant consequence of these frozen conflicts is that they destabilize the countries involved and make them unattractive to the international community. For the most part, no one in the West wants to invest in a dangerous country—there are too many risks involved. This is a situation that can be turned to the Kremlin’s advantage. The fewer ties a country has economically to the West, the less influence the West can exert there. The countries become isolated and are left to do business with only those who are willing to go there—either their own dysfunctional neighbors, or the country nearby with the biggest economy: the Russian Federation. Thus, economically and also politically these countries remain within Russia’s sphere of influence. Or if a country remains resistant to Russian regional leadership, as in Georgia’s case, the frozen conflict still tarnishes the country’s image. Frozen conflicts affect more than these countries’ standing in the international community, however. They also erode the actual efficiency of governance within the countries involved in the conflict. In the case of Georgia’s breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, since the Georgian government does not have any de facto control over these regions, they are not being effectively governed or policed. As a result, criminality and corruption thrive in these regions and tend to spill over into Georgia. This is another way of keeping Georgia weaker than it could be if it were able to establish order within its borders. This, then, is the desired result from maintaining frozen conflicts in Russia’s neighboring states—it leaves them weak and struggling, which forces them to look for outside help. But it also makes them look bad and gives them a reputation for violence, instability, and stubbornness. These traits make them appear unattractive to Europe and the United States, and leaves them with little choice but to turn to Russia for their support and assistance. While this is a superficial explanation of the deep issues behind frozen conflicts, it does provide a framework for seeing the way that Russia might benefit from maintaining the conflicts.

Granted, there are potential problems with maintaining such a policy. Keeping its neighbors weak, corrupt, and divided may benefit Russia in the short term, but in the long run no good will come of stunting their growth. Furthermore, Russia’s direct involvement with these conflicts is having a spillover effect that it surely does not want. Although the international community quickly turned a blind eye to Russia’s incursion into Georgia in 2008, the Crimean crisis has clearly disturbed the West. Sanctions, asset freezes, and visa bans are all proposed means to punish Russia for its involvement in the conflict, making Russia look more like Iran or Belarus in terms of likeability. But Putin and his government seem increasingly impervious to international criticism, and their reliance on oil and gas exports to prop up the Russian economy instead of diversifying the economy shows how short-sighted they can be in their policy making. Despite the long-term drawbacks to the continuation of frozen conflicts, the current Kremlin policy will remain unchanged—the invasion of Crimea is a testament to that.

The question now is how the West should respond to this pattern of frozen conflicts and Russia’s apparent will to initiate fresh ones. The question is now more urgent than ever for Ukraine. Although there seems to be a current consensus between the United States and the European Union that Russia’s latest misdeed should not go unpunished, the chances that whatever punishments they devise will make an impression on Putin are slim.[3] He will also inevitably respond in kind, as he has a history of retaliation against measures meant to punish him—the most notorious being the Dima Yakovlev Law which outlawed the adoption of Russian children by American citizens.[4] Rather, the heart of the problem must be addressed and Crimea should not be allowed to deteriorate into a frozen conflict. What Ukraine’s new government should do, supported by America and the EU, is be prepared to cut its losses in Crimea and address the possibility of ceding the territory to the Russian Federation, if the territory itself votes for secession in the upcoming referendum later this month.

While the results of such a referendum are illegal according to Ukraine’s constitution, perhaps it is worthwhile to bear in mind that the Verkhovna Rada’s impeachment of President Yanukovych was also illegal, as it was not done according to the procedure laid out in article 111 of Ukraine’s constitution.[5] Russia has the capability to defend its hold over the peninsula and on March 7^th, Russian Parliament stated its intention to support Crimean secession, should they vote for it.[6] It is highly improbable that Russia will stand down, given its usual inflexibility in defending its interests; the Syrian conflict comes to mind. There is very little that Ukraine can do or the West is willing to do to prevent it. Rather, recognizing Crimea’s secession and de facto annexation by Russia would accomplish several things. First, it would preclude the possibility of from turning into another frozen conflict. If Ukraine and Russia are able to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict, this will prevent the prolongation of the standoff and the increased marginalization of Crimea itself. This will in turn lead to an increase in Ukraine’s standing as a victim who managed to retain the moral high ground in an extremely tense situation. The EU will then be more likely to move forward with integrating Ukraine into Europe—starting with the delayed signing of an association agreement as part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, putting Ukraine on a positive trajectory towards greater integration with the West and the international institutions that will aid in its recovery.

The goal is not to give up Crimea in order to simply appease Russian aggression. Instead, sacrificing Crimea might allow Ukraine to make a clean break (as clean as possible) with Russia and turn towards a political and economic system that honors the rule of law and institutions over corruption, patronage and cronyism. This is not to say that the giving up Crimea would eliminate all future risk of Russian aggression or pressure; the risk will always be there as long as Vladimir Putin and his militocracy rules the Russian Federation. But countries like Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland have all successfully managed to spin away of Russia’s orbit despite their close proximity. Without the dead weight of a frozen conflict holding it down, perhaps Ukraine can too.

Sources/Further Reading:

Allison, Roy. 2009. “The Russian case for military intervention in Georgia: international law, norms and political calculation.” European Security, 18:2, 173-200.

Allison, Roy. 2013. “Russia, the West, and Military Intervention.” Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hill, William H. 2012. “Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova- Transnistrian Conflict.” Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.